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STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY:
THE PROBLEM OF
IMPROPERLY DESIGNED PRODUCTS*
By BRucE LEMER*:
The Ontario Law Reform Commission has advocated a significant change
in products liability law. In its Report on Products Liability, published in
1979, the Commission recommends that manufacturers be held strictly liable
for injuries arising from the use of defective products, regardless of the existence of any privity of contract between the manufacturer and plaintiff.' The
Commission would restrict recovery under strict liability to those damages
arising from a "defective product", defined in their Draft Bill as one that
"falls short of the standard that may reasonably be expected of it in all the
circumstances."' 2 This definition has simplicity in its favour. It is argued here,
however, that the Commission has failed to take into account the special
problems which arise when a court must decide whether or not a product is
improperly designed.3

© Copyright, 1982, Bruce Lemer.
* The author would like to thank Professor David Cohen for his valuable comments and advice.
** Member of the Bar of British Columbia.
I There are a number of compelling arguments in favour of strict liability. Briefly,
since strict liability is already used as the standard in breach of warranty cases it is
inequitable to apply a different, and, for the plaintiff, a more onerous standard in cases
where there happens to be no privity of contract. It is believed that strict liability will
encourage manufacturers to produce safer goods. Furthermore, the manufacturer is in
a better position to absorb the losses arising out of injuries by either insuring (the
manufacturer is more likely to insure than the consumer and is a cheaper insurer as
well) or by passing the cost of injuries on to all its customers thereby spreading the
loss throughout society. Finally, it is said to be morally appropriate that the manufacturer, who profits from the sale of his goods, be responsible for injuries caused by
faulty products.
See James, Products Liability (1955-56), 34 Texas L. Rev. 192; James, General
Products - Should ManufacturersBe Liable Without Negligence (1955-56), 24 Tenn.
L. Rev. 923; Noel, Manufacturers of Products The Drift Toward Strict Liability
(1955-56), 24 Tenn. L Rev. 963; Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability
to the Consumer) (1955-66), 50 Minn. L. Rev. 791.
2
Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Products Liability (Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General, 1979) at 135.
3
Another problem with the definition of defective product employed by the Commission is that it may set up a "generally prevailing standards defence". This defence,
established by a manufacturer proving that he has complied with generally prevailing or
statutory standards at the time the products left his hands, is one the Report itself recommends against: "In our view, it would be unwise to adopt a rule making compliance
conclusive, or even prima facie, proof of the absence of a defect." (Id. at 95).
Such a defence would "allow an entire industry-or subset thereof-to legitimize
its own comer cutting as the standard of due care, validating through its own practice
what independent assessment would label negligence." (Bovbjerg, The Medical Malpractice Standard of Care: HMOs and Customary Practice, [1975] Duke L.J. 1275 at
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I.

DESIGN DEFECTS AND THE POLYCENTRIC PROBLEM
When defining the term "defective product" it is essential to realize that
there are two types of defects: the manufacturing or production defect and
the design defect. The former defect is caused by careless manufacture or by
poor quality control. When such a defect is the subject of a court case, the
court is provided with a ready-made standard by which it may determine
whether or not a product is defectively manufactured: all the court need do is
compare it with perfect models of the same product. Thus, the defectively
manufactured product fails to meet the manufacturer's own expectations, as
revealed by his product's design.
The design defect arises when the design itself is inadequate. Unlike the
manufacturing defect cases, when this type of defect is the subject of a court
case, the court is not provided with a self-defining standard of defect: the
court cannot simply compare the object which caused an injury with a thousand other like objects produced by the defendant. Instead, in order to determine whether such a defect exists, the court must "develop or adopt from
some legitimate extra-judicial source, an objective standard of adequacy." 4
Because the adequacy of design must be determined using an objective
standard, a court must determine the reasonableness of the design, even under
a regime of strict liability. This entails a balancing of the seriousness and
likelihood of injury occurring with the utility of the product and the feasibility
of producing a safer one.
Design defect cases provide tremendous problems for the courts, whether
they are brought under the negligence regime or under a system of strict liability. They pose what have been called "polycentric problems". 5 The majority
of cases brought before the courts are not polycentric and involve the application of evidence in argument to a series of discrete issues, each issue being
isolated and dealt with individually. The issues are distinct and their outcomes
most often do not bear upon each other. For example, a contract case might
have three issues to be resolved: Was the contract properly signed? Was there
consideration for the contract? And, was the contract frustrated? Each issue
is distinct. If a question of forgery was resolved, the court would move on to
determine the existence of consideration and, in turn, if consideration was
found to have passed, the court would turn its attention to the question of

1395). While the Commission has recognized the danger and recommended against the
defence, it may have unwittingly taken the opposite position due to its unfortunate use
of the word "expected". The prevailing industrial standard could become the standard
applied by the courts simply because this would be what the consumer (or anyone else,
for that matter) reasonably expects from a product.
4 Henderson, Renewed Judicial Controversy Over Defective Product Design: Toward
the Preservationof an Emerging Consensus (1978-79), 63 Minn. L. Rev. 773 at 774. See
also Hoenig, Product Designs and Strict Tort Liability (1978-79), 8 S.W.U.L. Rev. 109
and Twerski, From Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault-Rethinking Some Product
Liability Concepts (1976-77), 60 Marquette L.R. 297.
5 See Fuller, Adjudication and the Rule of Law, [1960-61] Am. Soc. Int'l L. 1; Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of
Adjudication (1973), 73 Colum. L. Rev. 1531.
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frustration. It is easy to see that such a case, although it may involve difficult
concepts and complex issues, is readily amenable to solution by trial.
In contrast the essence of a polycentric problem is that the issues are
not discrete; they cannot be isolated from one another. This is best illustrated
with an example provided by Fuller:
[A] wealthy lady by the name of Tomken died in New York leaving a valuable,
but somewhat miscellaneous, collection of paintings to the Metropolitan Museum
and the National Gallery "in equal shares," her will indicating no particular apportionment. When the will was probated, the judge remarked something to the
effect that the parties seemed to be confronted with a real problem. The attorney
for one of the museums spoke up and said, "We are good friends. We will work
it out somehow or other." What makes this problem of effecting an equal division
of the paintings a polycentric task? It lies in the fact that the disposition of any
single painting has implications for the proper disposition of every other painting.
If it gets the Renoir, the Gallery may be less eager for the Cezanne, but all the
more eager for the Bellows, etc. If the proper apportionment were set for argu.
ment, there would be no clear issue which either side could direct its proofs and
contentions. Any judge assigned to hear such an argument would be tempted to
assume the role of mediator, or to adopt the classical solution: Let the older
brother (here the Metropolitan) divide the estate into what he regards as equal
shares, let the younger brother (the National Gallery) take his pick.0
Henderson further elaborates on the difficulties facing counsel when they
tackle polycentric problems:
A lawyer seeking to base his argument upon established principle and required to
address himself in discourse to each of a dozen strands, or issues, would find his
task frustratingly impossible. As he moved from the first point of his argument to
the second and then to the third, he would find his arguments regarding the earlier
points shifting beneath him. Unlike most of the traditional types of cases in which
litigants are able, in effect, to freeze the rest of the web as they concentrate upon
each separate strand, the web here retains its natural flexibility, adjusting itself in
seemingly
infinite variations as each new point, or strand, in the argument is
reached. 7
Design defect cases are polycentric essentially because the court must
go through the process of redesigning the product in order to determine the
reasonableness of its design. In this process, courts give value to injuries suffered and then ascertain whether additional safety measures should have been
adopted, taking into account factors such as the cost of safety improvements
and the functional utility of the product.8 The question, in its broadest per-

spective, boils down to: "What portion of society's limited resources are to be
allocated to [this product's] safety, thereby leaving less to be devoted to other
social objectives?" There could not, it would seem, be any problem more
polycentric than this one.
Courts do, of course, often deal with polycentric issues. However, Henderson points out that:

0

e Fuller, supra note 5.
7Henderson, supra note 5, at 1536.
8

Id.at 1540.

9

id.
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[Hlaving recognized that courts can, if the situation demands, provide some
kinds of responses to polycentric problems, one should also recognize the very real
threat to the integrity of the adjudicative process inhering in any broad-scale judicial commitment to doing so. The source and nature of this threat are not difficult
to understand. The very essence of the rule of law lies in the formally guaranteed
opportunity afforded to parties to participate meaningfully in the social processes
of decision. Whenever persons affected by such decisions are denied their right to
participate-as when, for example, public elections are rigged-the threat to the
integrity of those social processes of decision is substantial. And so, if courts were
ever to begin routinely to provide responses to highly polycentric problems, the
judicial process would be effectively subverted. Because of the absence of sufficiently specific rules upon which to argue or decide such cases, litigants would
be denied the traditionally guaranteed opportunity to participate meaningfully in
the decision-making process. Of course, they would still take part in the proceedings, but only in the limited sense of making speeches-not as litigants offering
proofs and arguments for a decision according to law. Their posture before the
court would become very much like that of a supplicant before a manager, appealing to the latter's discretion. And the courts, confronted systematically with polycentric problems in connection with which the litigants' proofs and arguments are
essentially useless, would inevitably be forced to resort to bases for decision bearing little, if any, relation to the presentation of the legal issues. Were such a
denial of the litigants' rights to meaningful participation to become commonplace,
the adjudicative process would become nothing more than an elaborate masquerade.10

Ungoed-Thomas, J., reiterates Henderson's basic point in his judgment in the
case of Texaco Ltd. v. Mulberry Filling Station Ltd." This case deals with

the reasonableness of a restrictive covenant. In attempting to define "reasonableness", the judge was confronted by a polycentric problem:
But what is meant by "reasonableness with reference to the interests of the public"? It is part of the doctrine of restraint of trade which is based on and directed
to securing the liberty of the subject and not the utmost economic advantage. It
is part of the doctrine of the common law and not of economics. So it must, of
course, refer to interests as recognisable and recognised by law. But if it refers to
interests of the public at large, it might not only involve balancing a mass of conflicting economic, social and other interests which a court of law might be illadapted to achieve; but, more important, interests of the public at large would lack
sufficiently specific formulation to be capable of judicial as contrasted with unregulated personal decision and application-a decision varying, as Lord Eldon put
it, like the length of the chancellor's foot.12

II. A PARTIAL SOLUTION
What can be done to solve this polycentric problem? One solution might be
to remove design defect litigation from the traditional courts which employ the

adversary system, and to create an administrative body specifically designed to
deal with products liability cases. This would be a radical departure from the
present system, however, and is unlikely to occur in the near future. Instead, the

cost-benefit analysis, which must be employed in deciding such cases, should be
made an explicit part of any definition of "defect" contained in a strict liability

10 Id. at 1539.

11 [1972] 1 W.L.R. 814, [1972] 1 All E.R. 513.
12 Id. at 847 (W.L.R.), 526 (All E.R.).
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statute. This solution has been advocated by a number of commentators."8 Dean
Wade, one of the most prominent, offers a list of seven factors which should
be considered when determining whether or not a design is defective:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to the user and to
the public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product-likelihood that it will cause injury, and
the probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same need and
not be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product
without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the
product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and
their avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the obvious conditions
of the product, or of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of 14
spreading the loss by
setting the price of the product or carrying liability insurance.
A similar approach was adopted by the California Court of Appeal in
the case of Barker v. Lull Engineering.1r The Court recognized that products
liability cases are not of a homogenous character and that the term "defect"
cannot be defined in the same manner in all cases:
Frihe defectiveness concept defies a simple, uniform definition applicable to all
sectors of the diverse product liability domain. Although in many instances-as
when one machine in a million contains a cracked or broken part-the meaning of
the term "defect" will require little or no elaboration; in other instances, as when
a product is claimed to be defective because of an unsafe design or an inadequate
warning, the contours of the defect concept may not be self-evident. In such a case
a trial judge may find it necessary to explain more fully to the jury the legal meaning of "defect" or "defective".16
The Court, moreover, believes that a system which requires a plaintiff to prove
the existence of a defect without providing him with the meaning of defect in
the context of the case at hand may prove more misleading than helpful. 17
The Court also recognized that a risk-benefit analysis is fundamental to
the design defect case:

1- See, e.g., Noel, Manufacturer'sNegligence of Design or Directions for Use of a
Product (1961-62), 71 Yale L.R. 817; Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of
Defect (1973-74), 5 St. Mary's L.J. 130; Henderson, Manufacturers' Liability for Defective Product Design: A ProposedStatutory Reform (1978), 56 N.C.L. Rev. 625; and
Weinstein et al., Product Liability: An Interaction of Law and Technology (1973-74),

12 Duq. L. Rev. 425.
14Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products (1973), 44 Miss. L.J.

825 at 837-38.
15 573 P. 2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (S.C. 1978).

IId. at 446 (P. 2d), 228 (Cal. Rptr.); followed by Hyman v. Gordon, 35 Cal. App.
3d 769, 111 Cal. Rptr. 262 (1973); Baccery v. General Motors Corp., 60 Cal. App.
3d 533, 132 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1976); Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Jeppesen & Co.,
463 F. Supp. 94 (Nev. Dist. Ct. 1978), Pherson v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 590

F. 2d 756 (9th Cir. 1978).
17 Supra note 16, at 453 (P. 2d), 235 (Cal. Rptr.).
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Numerous Californian decisions ... have made clear, through varying linguistic
formulations, that a product may be found defective in design, even if it satisfies
ordinary consumer expectations, if through hindsight the jury determines that the
product's design embodies "excessive preventable danger," or, in other words, if
the jury finds that the risk of danger inherent in the challenged design outweighs
the benefits of such design.18

The Court then suggested a list of factors, similar to Wade's seven factors, which a jury might consider in evaluating the adequacy of a product's

design.' 9
While this application of cost-benefit analysis to product design cases
may seem like a return to the negligence standard, it really is not, for under
strict liability, the manufacturer's knowledge of the defectiveness of his product is imputed to him by law. The plaintiff is spared the difficult task of
proving the manufacturer's scienter as a matter of fact. 20

The application of cost-benefit analysis to design defect litigation is certainly not without problems. First, while it would make the decision-making
process explicit, the ultimate decision made by a court would still involve the
use of generous amounts of judicial guesswork and intuition. 2 1 The same

18 Id. at 454 (P. 2d), 236 (Cal. Rptr.).
19 In obiter, the Court suggested the following relevant factors in determining design
adequacy:
A review of past cases indicates that in evaluating the adequacy of a product's
design pursuant to this latter standard, a jury may consider, among other relevant
factors, the gravity of the danger posed by the challenged design, the likelihood
that such danger would occur, the mechanical feasibility of a safer alternative design, and the adverse consequences to the product and to the consumer that would
result from an alternative design.
Id. at 455 (P. 2d), 237 (Cal. Rptr.).
20 Wade, supra note 14 at 834-35.
21 This problem is especially acute when scientific or engineering issues arise. Judges
and juries do not have the technological expertise to understand complex scientific issues
and cannot make a decision logically when the scientific community itself cannot offer
a conclusive opinion. Scientific decision making is often a subjective process. Scientists
may differ on the appropriateness of experimental methods or on the inferences to be
drawn from already accepted data. There are questions that, for practical or moral
reasons, cannot be answered through scientific investigation.
A perfect example of a trans-scientific issue is the extrapolation of carcinogenic
effects at high-dose levels to low-dose levels. In these cases, scientists can phrase
the question in scientific terms and can even agree upon an experiment that could
resolve it. For instance, to demonstrate with ninety-five percent confidence that the
carcinogenic response rate is less than one in a million, an experimenter need only
feed three million animals at the human exposure rate and compare the response
with three million control animals that have been raised under identical conditions
but with no exposure to the chemical. As a practical matter, however, scientists
cannot conduct this "mega mouse" experiment ... Scientists therefore test significantly fewer animals at much higher dosage rates. Thus, the only data available
to regulators are from experiments in which laboratory animals have been fed
high doses of a chemical. The agency can never be certain whether a chemical that
causes cancer at high doses will cause cancer at the lower doses to which humans
are typically exposed. (McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Ad-

256
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problem, however, would exist under the provisions of the Draft Bill. And it
would be compounded by the fact that the true basis for decision-making-the
cost-benefit analysis-would be hidden beneath the vague "reasonable expectation" standard used in the Draft Bill.
Secondly, the California Court of Appeal has pointed out that the existence of different standards for design and manufacturing defects would make
it possible for a party to gain an advantage by having the defect classified
under one category instead of the other, and that the distinction between the
two types of defects is not always easily made:
It is difficult to prove that a product ultimately caused injury because [a widget]
was poorly welded-a defect in manufacture-rather than because it was made
of inexpensive metal difficult to weld, chosen by a designer concerned with economy-a defect in design.... We wish to avoid providing such a battleground for
clever counsel.m
Thirdly, it is not entirely certain that the distinction between design and
manufacturing defects is desirable or justified. It has been contended that
Wade's factors must equally be applied in cases involving manufacturing
defects:
Since all products are flawed at some technological level, the decision must still
be made as to when a flaw emerges as a defect. In order to make the decision,
some judgmental standard must be utilized. It is clear.., that this standard must
be based on the concept of unreasonable danger.23

Indeed, all manufacturing defects may be characterized as design defects.
Theoretically, one can conceive of a product and the process by which it was
manufactured as being one and the same thing. There are, of course, the two
types of defects: those arising in the manufacturing process and those inherent in the design of the product. The former can be eliminated by such things
as the exercise of great care by assembly line workers, the use of well-planned
production lines, and generally, a large investment in quality control. The
latter can be eliminated by careful thought, extensive planning and testing,
and generally, a large investment in engineering. If we propose to look at the
costs and benefits of investments in engineering by applying Wade's criteria
to the design defect, is there any reason why a similar cost-benefit analysis
should not be applied to investments in quality control? Likely not. On the

ministrative Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in
PEA and OSHA (1978-79), 67 Georgetown L.J. 729 at 733-34.)

Compounding the problem is the fact that judges and juries are at the mercy of expert
witnesses:
A glib and unscrupulous expert witness with no qualification in his professed field
other than a willingness to sell any opinion to anyone who wants it will frequently
out sell the conscientious, well-trained and careful expert who gives no opinion that
he cannot back up. The concept that the [jury] can detect a fraud is absurd.

Graham, Impeaching the ProfessionalExpert Witness by a Showing of FinancialInterest

(1977-78), 53 Indiana LJ. 35 at 41n. 29.
22 Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P. 2d 1153 at 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 at 443.
23

Weinstein et al., Product Liability, supra note 13, at 430-31.
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one hand, we are dealing with the design of the product; on the other hand,
the design of a quality control system. It is difficult to distinguish logically
the two cases.
Despite the difficulties involved in separating design defects from production defects, the distinction is, nonetheless practical and appropriate. First, the
problems outlined by the California Court of Appeal and the difficulties involved in determining whether or not the product flaw deviates from an acceptable range of "normality" will likely seldom arise.
Secondly, although both types of defects might logically be analyzed in
the same way, there are strong policy arguments in favour of making a distinction and using the cost-benefit analysis only when considering product
design. First, given the difficulties which arise when courts deal with the polycentric problems associated with cost-benefit analysis, it is worthwhile to minimize their involvement in this area. Since we have a ready-made standard of
defectiveness in manufacturing defect cases-the product which caused the
plaintiff's injury need only be compared with the manufacturer's own designthe use of Wade's factors is unnecessary. Secondly, because of their financial
resources and technical expertise, manufacturers would have a distinct advantage in the broad inquiry that a complex cost-benefit analysis would entail. This imbalance should not be extended to cases involving manufacturing
defects. Thirdly, the scope and significance of a design-defect case is greater
that that of a production-flaw case: if the design is found to be inadequate,
the entire line of product is impugned, whereas if the product was simply incorrectly assembled, the rest of the line is unaffected. Thus, a more complex
cost-benefit inquiry in design cases seems justified. Finally, one of the primary
justifications for strict liability is that manufacturers can spread the cost of
accidents amongst their many customers or protect themselves by insurance
and that, therefore, liability should be shifted to the manufacturer automatically. However, as Hoenig points out, this reasoning breaks down to some
extent in the area of design defects:
The risk spreading rationale as applied to manufacturing defects has more forceful justification than to situations where design is involved. Indesign claims, the
open-ended nature of the legal inquiry (how much design safety is enough?)

makes it likely that the manufacturer's cost calculation task is much more complicated and, therefore, stands on a different footing. It is quite possible that insurance coverage for the risk of high exposure claims based upon defective design
is either too expensive or unavailable. 4

Thus, it seems sensible to apply strict liability without cost-benefit analysis
only to manufacturing defects.
Another criticism of the Wade formulation is that it simply does not go
far enough in amending the existing law and that it violates the spirit of strict
liability. Calabresi and Hirschoff believe that design defect cases employing
the Wade formulation "degenerate into either meaningless semantic disputes

24

Supra note 4, at 130.
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or attempts at balancing the costs of the accident against the cost of avoiding
it... like the very calculus of negligence ...which strict liability was meant
to replace. '25 The two authors reject cost-benefit analysis and instead would
have the court place liability upon "which of the parties... is in the best position to make the cost-benefit analysis between accident costs and accident
avoidance cost and to act on that decision once it is made."20 They contend
that this boils down to a search for the "cheapest cost-avoider" (though one
might imagine circumstances in which one who is not best able to calculate
the probability of an accident would nonetheless be able to prevent the accident most cheaply) .
Calabresi and Hirschoff seek to avoid some problems associated with
the Wade formulation. First, they claim that such a test is easier to apply
than a polycentric cost-benefit analysis because the court would consider
simpler questions, such as, "which party is better informed as to risks and
alternatives instead of... questions requiring the weighing of accident costs
and avoidance costs, both of which must be subjectively determined by the
trier of fact." 28 Secondly, because the comparison is to be made between
categories of defendants and plaintiffs, the authors claim that their test would
reduce the volume of litigation: if one type of manufacturer is found to be
in the best position to make the cost-benefit analysis in one case, all manufacturers in that same category would be presumptively liable, unless special
circumstances existed. Theoretically, parties to a product liability case would
be able to get a clearer idea of who would be liable, and consequently, would
be more likely to settle. Thirdly, the authors claim that, since the courts would
not have to redesign products during litigation, their test "implies a lesser degree of governmental intervention" 2 than does the judicial cost-benefit
analysis.
Would the Calabresi-Hirschoff proposal increase the certainty of a law,
reduce litigation, and encourage settlement? The decision as to which party is
in the best position to make a cost-benefit analysis may be at least marginally
easier to make than the polycentric cost-benefit analysis itself. Marschall believes that the Calabresi-Hirschoff test is also an extremely difficult one to
apply:
Although theoretically appealing, the test is impractical and inefficient because of
the difficulties involved in locating the best decision-maker. Judges and juries are
not trained to draw multi-branched decision trees. To compare the decision-making
abilities of a manufacturer at one point in time with those of a consumer at another raises questions too complex and uncertain of outcome for the real world
negotiation and trial practice. The Calabresi and Hirschoff system would necessitate more lawyer, judge and jury hours to settle or try each case. Its extreme flexi-

25 Calabresi and Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts (1971-72),
81 Yale LJ. 1055 at 1056.
26 Id.at 1060.

Id. at 1072.
8Id. at 1061 n. 21.

27
2

29 Id. at 1061.
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bility would make predictions of trial outcomes more speculative than under existing tests of strict liability 30
While Marschall may exaggerate the uncertainty inherent in the Cala-

bresi-Hirschoff test, another factor also promises to reduce the ability of
this formulation to minimize litigation and calls into question its basic justification, namely, that it does not require the use of a difficult cost-benefit analysis to determine liability. The Calabresi-Hirschoff test provides that, in
order for liability to attach to the party which can best perform the costbenefit analysis, that party must also be in the best position to act upon its
decision. But in order to determine which party was in the best position to
act, the court must enter into the same balancing process involved in Wade's
formulation: the costs and benefits of the consumer taking precautions to
avoid an injury must be determined and compared with the costs and benefits
of a manufacturer producing a safer product (or not producing the questionable product at all). Apparently, then, the authors' contention that their formulation avoids the need for a cost-benefit analysis is not entirely valid. At
most, it can be said to reduce that need.
III. CONCLUSION

Canadian courts have seldom been faced with difficult design defect
cases. Indeed, it would be more accurate to say that the courts have seldom
been faced with design cases at all. 31 What judgments we do have are characterized by the use of conclusory statements in place of well articulated

reasoning and a balancing of factors. When dealing with a complex technological case, however, more specific rules of decision making must replace the
vague reasonableness standard which the courts would inevitably use when
deciding design defect cases under the regime of strict liability proposed by

SO Marschall, An Obvious Wrong Does Not Make A Right: Manufacturers' Liability
For Patently DangerousProducts (1973), 48 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 1065 at 1101.
31 It is unclear why this is so. Writing with specific reference to automobile design
cases, Robert Zarnett provides three reasons:
First, since the remedy is private in nature, only the individual who has been injured may initiate the suit. Insurance companies, which would provide a more
concerted pattern of litigation, have failed to attempt to procure indemnity or
contribution from automobile manufacturers when injury, death or property damage results from the unsafe design of motor vehicles. There may be several reasons for this omission. The insurance industry might hesitate to attack another
industry in fear of reprisals directed at its own questionable practices. If provoked,
the automobile industry might conceivably compete in the liability insurance field.
Finally, it also has available as leverage its position as a substantial consumer
of general indemnity insurance for its large plants and equipment.
Secondly, failure to consider the possibility of a design suit may result in the
loss of evidence when the damaged automobile is repaired or junked after the
crash. The injured party then loses forever the evidence which is the sine qua non
of an automobile products liability suit.
Thirdly, lawyers in Canada have paid little attention to the potential damage
remedy against the automobile manufacturer for unsafe design. The reason for the
inaction in this area can only be a subject for speculation. (Tort Liability for Defective Automobile Design (1975), 13 Osgoode Hall L.J. 484 at 496).
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the Commission.32 Without specific rules which reflect the balancing process
underlying the design defect case, "foreseeability, consistency, and other qualities of principled decision making will confine to be lacking and the integrity
of the judicial system will... be threatened. '33

3
2 See, e.g., Smith v. Inglis Ltd. (1978), 25 N.S.R. (2d) 38, 6 C.C.L.T. 41 (C.A.);
Edmonton Flying Club v. Northward Aviation Ltd. (1979), 17 A.R. 507, [1979] 6 W.W.R.
633 (C.A.), leave to appeal denied, (1979), 21 A.R. 270 (S.C.C.); Lambert v. Lewis,
[1980] 2 W.L.R. 299, [1980] 1 All E.R. 978, [1980] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 311 (Eng. C.A.);
Murphy v. Atlantic Speedy Propane (1979), 103 D.L.R. (3d) 545, 35 N.S.R. (2d) 422,
62 A.P.R. 422 (Tr. Div.).
A few judgments have addressed the need to balance costs and benefits of product
design. For instance, Mr. Justice Laskin (as he then was), in the case of Jordan House
Ltd. v. Menow, [1974] S.C.R. 239 at 247, 38 D.L.R. (3d) 105 at 110 stated:
The common law assesses liability for negligence on the basis of breach of a duty
of care arising from a foreseeable and unreasonable risk of harm to one person
created by the act or omission of another.... Moreover, in considering whether
the risk of injury to which a person may be exposed is one that he should not
reasonably have to run, it is relevant to relate the probability and the gravity of
injury to the burden that would be imposed upon the prospective defendant in
taking avoidance measures.
See also Mitchell v. City of Vancouver (1979), 15 B.C.L.R. 34, (1979), 10 C.C.L.T.
139 (S.C.) (concerning the design of a municipal road hazard inspection system), Adelaide Chemical and Fertilizer Co. v. Carlyle (1940), 64 A.C.L.R. 514, (1941) A.L.R. 10,
14 A.L.J. 334 (Aust. H.C.); Malat v. Bjornson (No. 2) (1978), 5 W.W.R. 429, 6
C.C.L.T. 162 (B.C.S.C,), addendum to reasons, [1979] 4 W.W.R. 673, 19 B.C.L.R. 28,
13 C.C.LT. 162 (S.C.).
3 Henderson, supra note 4, at 780.

